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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD INTERPRET THE LANGUAGE IN IDAHO CODE §5-
219( 4) SO AS TO AVOID THE "ABSURD RESULT" OF DISALLO\VING 
MISDIAGNOSIS LA\VSUITS, \VITH NO REMEDY MERELY BECAUSE A 
BIOPSY (OR OTHER TEST) COULD BE PERFORMED. 
Respondents frame their argument to limit this court's decision to a strict application of 
Idaho Code § 5-219 which will invariably come dmvn as a "harsh result" in any misdiagnosis of 
cancer case. However, the Idaho Supreme Court has previously interpreted the language in LC. 
§5-219( 4) "flexibly" to "avoid absurd results" and should do so in this case. Davis v. 1'v1oran, 112 
Idaho 703, 708, 735 P.2d 1014, 1019 (Idaho 1987). The Respondents' interpretation of Idaho 
Code §5-219( 4) unavoidably leads to such absurd results. In Davis, the plaintiff had a spinal 
cord iajury as a result of excessive radiation. Id at 705, 1016. Although the plaintiff filed suit 
more than two years after the date of the actual radiation exposure, the "time of the ... act... 
complained of," the court refused to enforce the strict application ofldaho Code §5-219( 4) 
because it would lead to injustice. Id. 709, 1020. 
In general, requiring the clock to begin at the time of the misdiagnosis would similarly 
lead to an injustice, to wit; a patient would be required to question every diagnosis and seek a 
second opinion immediately after the diagnosis. Hmvever, doing just that would dissolve any 
possibility of injury because the misdiagnosis \Vould be corrected immediately. Similarly, if the 
patient were to trust the doctor's misdiagnosis and not seek a second opinion until problems 
begin to arise, possibly 
disallows it. 
later, there would also be no Idaho Code §5-219( 4) 
Here, there is no way of detem1ining any injury had occurred at the time of the 
misdiagnosis by Respondent Scott. The only evidence that can prove the injury is the biopsy that 
\Vas performed much later, on August 31, 2012. (R. p. 19, 75). In fact, Respondents' expert, 
Dr. Gregory Wells, relied on that biopsy to fom1 his opinion that had he performed a biopsy at 
the time of the misdiagnosis, that biopsy "·would have come back positive." (Brief of 
Respondents at p. 9 1 6). The time limit for pursuing a malpractice claim should not begin until 
the injury can be established. Here, the only way to establish that injury is to use the biopsy 
actually performed on August 31, 2012. Once performed the date of biopsy should commence 
the time limit in Idaho Code §5-219(4) because it is the inception of the cause of action for 
malpractice. Indeed, had the biopsy came back negative for cancer, there would be no lawsuit at 
all. 
II. RESPONDENTSRELYONCONCLUSORYSTATEMENTSBYTHEIREXPERT 
AND MISAPPLY PREVIOUS CASE LA \V \VHILE IGNORING THE FACTS OF 
THE PRESENT CASE. 
The Respondents improperly equate symptoms with damage. Symptoms do not 
determine when the time limit begins to run. See Stuard v. Jorgenson, 150 Idaho 701,705,249 
P.3d 1156, 1160 (Idaho 2011). Respondents argue that there \Vas an injury when the cancer was 
"symptomatic." (Respondents brief page 9:6). However, symptoms cannot indicate an 
"objective" injury. As discussed in Stuard, the primary case upon which Respondents rely, 
"symptoms are by nature subjective, and therefore are not detenninative in an objective analysis 
2 
as the one this Court has stated is 
malpractice claim." Stuard at 705, 1160. 
standard evaluating the accrual of a professional 
Respondents' expert gives many conclusory statements that cannot be considered for 
purposes of summary judgment. Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'! A1ed. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 
164, 45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002) (In a medical malpractice case, statements that are conclusory do 
not satisfy either the requirement of admissibility or competency under Rules 56( e )). Riddled 
throughout the defense expert's opinion are statements such as "the injury was objectively 
ascertainable;" it \Vas "malignant and progressive,'' "the cancer \Vas dangerous to the patient's 
health and causing further damage" and "the cancer continued to progress and grow every day. 
(Respondents Brief pp. 7-10). However, no biopsy was performed prior to August 31, 2012 and 
the defense expert admits that only a biopsy could reveal if the cancer was malignant or not. (R. 
pp. 119-120 paragraph 7.) 
Respondents mischaracterize the Court's opinion in Hawley v. Green, 117 Idaho 498, 788 
P.2d 1321, (1990), claiming that the presence of a tumor is sufficient evidence of an injury. 
(Respondents Brief at p. 16). On the contrary, the Hawley court stated that presence of a tumor 
is not enough and that evidence of the cancer's disposition was necessary to determine an injury, 
specifically, whether the cancer is malignant, progressive or ham1ful at that point in time. Id at 
504. In Hawley, no biopsy was performed to confirm if the cancer was malignant and the court 
refused to speculate if the cancer was dangerous or progressive. Id. at 504. Here however, the 
Dr. Wells has no problem v,:ith such speculation and Respondents encourage the court to rely on 
Dr. Wells contradictory statements to find that objective evidence existed that Mr. Wyman \Vas 
3 
cancer when seen Scott Such speculation is unfounded, conclusory, 
and cannot be relied upon for purposes of summary judgment. For a summary judgment motion 
to be granted based on Idaho Code §5-219(4), the defendants have the duty of proving the start 
date "with precision." See Weisbuch v. County of L.A., 119 F.3d 778, 783 n. 1. Respondents 
have failed to do so. 
III. RESPONDENTS RELIANCE ON STUARD IS MISPLACED BECAUSE THE 
CASES ARE FACTUALLY DISSIMILAR TO THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT 
CASE. 
In Stuard v. Jorgensen, Idaho 701,705,249 P.3d 1156, 1160 (Idaho 2011), the plaintiff 
suffered objectively ascertainable damages from the surgery itself, including the removal of 
healthy tissue and the installation of hardware at the wrong level. Here, there are no such 
invasive procedures. In fact, there were no procedures at all which injured Mr. Wyman. The lack 
of action is the failure here. 
In Stuard, the fact that plaintiffs injuries occurred during the surgery was not disputed. 
Id at 1160. Plaintiff's back was cut into, healthy tissue \Vas negligently removed, and a locking 
plate, scre\vs, and other hardware were negligently placed at the wrong spinal level. Id Here, 
any existence of an objectively ascertainable injury is disputed by the plaintiffs treating 
physician, Dr. Khong. (R. p. 198 13-17.) 
The Stuard Court recognized that had Plaintiff's claim survived the motion for summary 
~ . 
judgment and gone to trial, he likely would have asked for compensation for the procedures that 
were performed, causing damages. Thus, these damages satisfied the "some damage" standard. 
That is not the case here. Stuard in many ways supports the ,li.ppellants' contention that there 
4 
was no objectively ascertainable at the time of the because Stuard 
did not rely on the whether a diagnostic test could have been performed. Instead, the injury was 
caused during the negligent performance of a surgical procedure. Here, the mere fact that a 
biopsy could be performed does not constitute an objectively ascertainable injury. 
IV. APPELLANTS' APPEAL IS NEITHER FRIVILOUS, UNREASONED NOR 
BROUGHT \VITHOUT FOUNDATION AND AS SUCH RESPONDENTS CLAIM 
FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES IS IMPROPER. 
Appellants brought this appeal challenging the factual findings of the lower court and the 
application of those facts to LC.§ 5-219. Although the District Court went out of its \vay to 
assert it was not weighing the evidence, he in fact did so by giving weight to Dr. Well's affidavit 
and finding that Dr. Khong's deposition testimony did not create a disputed issue of material 
fact. As argued in their opening brief, Dr. Khong' s testimony was actually agreed to by Dr. 
We!Is in that, only after a biopsy is performed, can a diagnosis of cancer be accomplished. 
(Appellant's brief at p. 18). The use of revisionist history by Dr. Wells to speculate what he 
might have discovered had a biopsy in fact been performed by Ms. Scott, is not the kind of 
objectively ascertainable evidence of harm that the case law cited by the parties contemplates. 
As there is no statutory right to attorneys' fees on appeal of a motion for summary judgment, and 
Appellants' appeal \Vas not brought furiously, unreasonably or without foundation, Respondents, 
even if this Court upholds the District Court's findings and ruling, is not entitled to recover 
attorneys' fees. 
5 
argued in their opening brief, due to errors committed by the district court in 
granting Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court should reverse the 
district court's ruling and remand this case for further proceedings. 
As Appellant's appeal is based on misapplication of I.C. § 5-219 and case law 
interpreting the same, Respondents claim for attorneys' fees in likewise misplaced and should be 
denied. 
DA TED July 14111 , 2016. 
4252 :South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
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